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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
  
 This case presents the question whether under New 
Jersey law a casino patron may recover from a casino for gambling 
losses caused by the casino's conduct in serving alcoholic 
beverages to the patron and allowing the patron to continue to 
gamble after it becomes obvious that the patron is intoxicated.   
3 
 The plaintiff in this case, Ayhan Hakimoglu, filed two 
separate actions in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against defendants associated with two 
Atlantic City casinos.  Invoking the district court's diversity 
jurisdiction, his complaints alleged that the defendants had 
"intentionally and maliciously enticed him" to gamble at the 
casinos on numerous occasions by providing him with free 
alcoholic beverages and other amenities; that while he gambled he 
was served free alcoholic beverages until he became intoxicated; 
that after he became "visibly and obviously intoxicated" the 
defendants "invited and permitted him to continue to gamble in 
that condition" for lengthy periods; and that he consequently 
incurred "substantial gambling losses."  Asserting claims for 
negligence, intentional and malicious conduct, and unjust 
enrichment, he sought to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages, as well as other relief. 
  In both cases, the district court dismissed the 
plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim on which relief 
could be granted.  The court issued a detailed published opinion 
in one case, Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal, 876 F.Supp. 625 
(D.N.J.), and it relied on this opinion in the other.  Although 
the defendants' counterclaims for gambling-related debts had not 
been completely adjudicated, the court directed the entry of 
final judgment on the plaintiff's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(b).  The plaintiff appealed in both cases, and the appeals 
were consolidated.  
4 
 Our task in this appeal is to predict whether the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey would recognize claims such as those 
asserted by the plaintiff.  Unfortunately, we must make this 
prediction without specific guidance from the New Jersey 
appellate courts, for neither the Supreme Court of New Jersey nor 
the Appellate Division has addressed the question that is now 
before us or any closely related question.  If New Jersey law, 
like that of some other states,0 permitted us to certify the 
question at issue to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, we would 
seek to do so here, because the question is both difficult and 
important.  New Jersey law, however, does not allow such 
certification, and therefore we are relegated to predicting what 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey would do if it were confronted 
with this question.0   
 While we are required to venture this prediction and 
while we recognize the need to issue a published opinion for the 
guidance of the district courts in the circuit, we understand 
that our decision here is unlikely to have -- and should not     
have -- lasting precedential significance.  We expect that claims 
such as those advanced by the plaintiff in this case will work 
their way up through the New Jersey court system and that the New 
Jersey appellate courts will provide a definitive answer to the 
question before us.  For this reason and because most of the 
                     
0See e.g., Del. Const., art. IV, sec. 9; Del. Sup. Ct. R. 
41(a)(ii). 
0Judges Nygaard and Alito join section V of Judge Becker's 
Dissent, and enthusiastically endorse his recommendations 
therein. 
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chief arguments on both sides of this question have already been 
set out in excellent published district court opinions, we do not 
find it necessary to engage in a lengthy discussion here.   The 
opinion in GNOC v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1993), argues 
forcefully that the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize 
claims like those in this case.  By contrast, the published 
opinion of the district court in one of the cases now before us 
and the opinion in Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, 819 F. 
Supp. 1312, 1317 n.8 (D.N.J. 1993), aff'd, 34 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 
1994), persuasively set out the opposite case.0     
                     
0On appeal in this case, we did not decide the question that is 
now before us.  See Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 
1227, 1232 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1994).  In that case, the casino sued 
Tose for gambling debts, and Tose responded with a counterclaim 
similar to the claims of the plaintiff here.  The district court 
judge to whom the case was initially assigned ruled, in 
accordance with Aboud, that the plaintiff's allegations stated a 
claim on which relief could be granted under New Jersey law.  The 
case was later reassigned to a different district court judge, 
and that judge allowed the counterclaim to go to trial based on 
the law-of-the-case doctrine, but in his published opinion he 
expressed his reservations concerning Aboud.  See 819 F. Supp. at 
1317 n.8.  The counterclaim was tried to a jury, and Tose lost. 
Tose appealed the district court's denial of his motion for a new 
trial, and the casino argued, among other things, that the 
district court should not have exercised jurisdiction over the 
counterclaim because it lay within the exclusive primary 
jurisdiction of the state Casino Control Commission.  We rejected 
this argument, as well as Tose's contentions regarding the denial 
of the new trial motion.  We expressly declined to predict 
whether the state supreme court would hold that Tose's 
counterclaim stated a claim on which relief could be granted. See 
34 F. 3d at 1232 n.7.  We did observe:  "[W]hile we do not make a 
ruling on the point, a reasonable argument can be made that a 
casino owes a common law duty to a patron to prevent him from 
gambling when it knows he is intoxicated."  Id. This comment did 
not decide the question presented in this case; nor do we 
interpret it as inconsistent with our holding in this appeal.  We 
completely agree that "a reasonable argument can be made" in 
support of a result contrary to the one we reach.  However, 
6 
 Although it is not clear which way the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would rule on this question--as the conflicting 
district court opinions illustrate--it seems to us more likely 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not recognize claims such 
as those that the plaintiff asserted.  In reaching this 
conclusion, we find it significant that, except in cases 
involving minors, the New Jersey courts have not extended "the 
liability of servers of alcoholic beverages beyond injuries 
related to drunken driving, barroom accidents and barroom 
brawls."  Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 632.  The intense state 
regulation of casinos is also important because, as the district 
court observed in this case: 
[e]xtending common law dram-shop liability into an area 
so fully regulated, without a glimmer of legislative 
intent, is not a predictable extension of common law 
tort principles, and has not been foreshadowed by the 
New Jersey courts. 
 
676 F. Supp. at 633 (footnote omitted).  And as the district 
court noted in Tose:  
[c]onsidering the breadth of areas covered by statute 
and regulation, it would seem that if it were indeed 
the public policy of New Jersey to impose liability on 
casinos for allowing intoxicated patrons to gamble, 
that policy would have been enacted.  The State has 
regulated the minutiae of gaming rules and alcohol 
service and expressly permitted the serving of free 
drinks to patrons at the gambling tables.  Surely it 
could not have been unaware that the cognitive 
functioning of many gamblers would be impaired 
by drinking or of the consequences of permitting 
persons so impaired to gamble. 
 
819 F. Supp. at 1317 n.8. 
                                                                  
forced to predict whether the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
accept that argument, we predict that it would not. 
7 
 We are also influenced by the difficult problems of 
proof and causation that would result from the recognition of 
claims such as those involved here.  As the district court judge 
in this case aptly put it: 
[e]nlargement [the doctrine of dram-shop liability] to 
casino gambling losses could present almost 
metaphysical problems of proximate causation, since 
sober gamblers can play well yet lose big, intoxicated 
gamblers can still win big, and under the prevailing 
rules and house odds, "the house will win and the 
gamblers will lose" anyway in the typical transaction. 
Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 636 (quoting Greate Bay, 34 F.3d at  
 
1233 n.8).  Moreover, 
 
[s]uch a cause of action could be fabricated with 
greater ease than a dram-shop action involving personal 
injury, since in the accident case the occurrence of 
the accident is a specific notable event and reliable 
evidence of blood alcohol content is usually obtained; 
in the gambling loss case, on the other hand, a dram-
shop negligence claim might be brought up to two years 
after the gambling events concerning plays of which no 
casino dealer or server could have reason to recollect. 
Although sometimes highstakes table games are 
videotaped using surveillance cameras, such tapes from 
multiple cameras would amount to hundreds of hours of 
films per day that are routinely recycled rather than 
retained if no incident is reported within thirty days. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has expressed concern for 
the reliability of evidence of intoxication and its 
effects, . . . and such reliability is largely absent 
after-the-fact in the casino gaming environment. 
 
876 F. Supp. at 637.  
 For these reasons and many of the others mentioned in 
the district court opinions in this case and Tose, we predict 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not permit recovery on 
claims such as those asserted by the plaintiff here. Accordingly, 
we affirm the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's 
8 
claims in both cases, and we remand to the district court for 
further proceedings on the defendants' counterclaims. 
9 
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BECKER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting Opinion. 
 Ayhan Hakimoglu played his hand, and lost.  Now we are 
being asked to make our own bet.  Sitting in diversity, we must 
predict how the highest court of New Jersey would rule.  See 
Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 
1990).  As the majority points out, we must make this prediction 
with little guidance from New Jersey law.  But that is an 
incident -- and a flaw -- of the regime of diversity 
jurisdiction.  I believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
recognize a cause of action, in tort, allowing patrons to recover 
gambling debts from casinos that serve them alcohol after they 
are visibly intoxicated.0  This prediction is founded on long 
                     
0In addition to the tort theory Hakimoglu has pursued, a gambler 
in his position may have a claim in contract.  The gambler's 
obvious intoxication, one might argue, voided the gambling 
contract.  See, e.g., Feighner v. Sauter, 259 N.J. Super. 583, 
590, 614 A.2d 1071, 1075 (App. Div. 1992) (listing grounds for 
contract rescission, including intoxication); Onderdonk v. 
Presbyterian Homes of New Jersey, 85 N.J. 171, 183, 425 A.2d 
1057, 1062 (1981) (every contract has "implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing").  The district court seemed to doubt the 
existence of this "so-called gambling 'contract'" because "there 
is no mutuality."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 17 n.7.  "The patron does not 
negotiate the terms of his relationship with the casino," the 
court explained, "nor can the patron or the casino vary the rules 
of the game, the odds, or the payoffs."  Id.; see also Tose v. 
Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 n.8 
(D.N.J. 1993) ("[B]ecause every aspect of the relationship 
between the gambler and the casino is minutely regulated by the 
state[,] there is little of freedom contract in the usual 
sense.").  But the patron retains the choice whether to play, and 
how much to bet.  Thus, this situation is little different from 
10 
standing trends in New Jersey law recognizing new causes of 
action, even in areas pervaded by legislation.   
 In my view, the New Jersey Supreme Court is especially 
likely to create a cause of action where a defendant profits from 
conduct causing the foreseeable injury, and has the ability, in 
the exercise of due care, to prevent such injury at small cost to 
itself.  Because this case presents these factors, and because I 
am unpersuaded by the majority's arguments, I would reverse the 
judgment of the district court and remand for trial on the 
merits.  I also write to underscore a crucial point mentioned by 
the majority:  as New Jersey has no certification procedure, we 
are forced to make important state policy with little guidance. I 
therefore suggest that New Jersey, to serve its own interests and 
ours, enact a certification provision.   
 
I.  
 In predicting the course of New Jersey law, we must 
focus on policies and trends in the jurisprudence of New Jersey.0 
                                                                  
most sales contracts.  Purchasing a hair dryer, for example, 
forms a contract even though the price is set and the 
characteristics of the good are heavily regulated.  On what other 
basis is the casino legally able to keep the gambler's money 
after he loses?  Moreover, the pervasive regulation of the 
gambling relationship does not nullify its contractual nature. 
New Jersey courts have held that gambling on credit markers forms 
a contract between the casino and the patron, see Lomonaco v. 
Sands Hotel, 259 N.J. Super. 523, 614 A.2d 634 (Law Div. 1992), 
and that the Casino Control Act did not abrogate traditional 
common law contract defenses such as intoxication.  See id.  
However, Hakimoglu has declined to press a contract claim and 
hence we do not decide the question. 
0Precedent from Nevada, the only other state in which casino 
gambling is legal, provides no help, for Nevada does not 
11 
See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (in evaluating state law, "relevant state precedents 
must be scrutinized with an eye toward the broad policies that 
informed those adjudications and to the doctrinal trends which 
they evince"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has long been a leader in expanding tort liability. 
For example, it was one of the first courts to announce the 
doctrine of strict liability, applying it to automobiles.  See 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960).  Moreover, the court's recent cases show its continuing 
willingness to expand tort liability in a variety of contexts. 
See, e.g., Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 366 (1987) 
(imposing a duty of care on water companies to ensure adequate 
water pressure for firefighters); T&E Industries, Inc. v. Safety 
Light Corp., 123 N.J. 371, 587 A.2d 1249 (1991) (recognizing a 
cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a 
previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination); Hopkins 
v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993) 
(imposing a duty of care for the safety of visitors to open 
houses); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994) 
(expanding bystander liability to include a fianceé).   Most 
relevant for our purposes, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
                                                                  
recognize dram shop liability at all.  See Hamm v. Carson City 
Nugget, Inc., 450 P.2d 358 (Nev. 1969).  The federal government 
has virtually complete authority over Native American Indian 
reservations, see James J. Belliveau, Casino Gambling Under The 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Narragansett Tribal Sovereignty 
Versus Rhode Island Gambling Law, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 389 
(1994), but there is no federal law in this area. 
12 
consistently imposed liability on providers of alcohol for 
foreseeable drinking-related injuries -- even though the sale of 
alcoholic beverages has been intensely regulated for many years. 
See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) 
(recognizing action for death and damages against tavern that 
sold alcohol to minor).  The court has imposed common law tort 
liability upon tavern owners and restaurateurs for furnishing 
alcohol to intoxicated persons who subsequently cause injury 
through drunk driving.  See Sorenen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 
N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966) (extending dram shop liability to 
patron's own injuries), modified in part by Lee v. Kiku 
Restaurant, 127 N.J. 170, 603 A.2d 503 (1992).  Importantly, 
under New Jersey law, the person who was served while intoxicated 
himself can sue the tavernkeeper even for damages to his car. See 
N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-5(a).  Additionally, the court has extended this 
liability to social hosts, even though they, unlike tavern 
owners, do not profit from the transaction.  It "makes little 
sense to say that [a licensed defendant] is under a duty to 
exercise care, but give immunity to a social host who may be 
guilty of the same wrongful conduct merely because he is 
unlicensed."  Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 
(1976); accord Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 
(1984) (extending dram shop liability to social hosts).    
 The only two New Jersey cases to address the present 
issue, both from a federal district court, have predicted that 
New Jersey would recognize this cause of action.  In GNOC Corp. 
v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989), Judge Cohen opined that 
13 
"New Jersey has unambiguously communicated a strong policy 
against the noxious potential of excessive alcohol consumption in 
the twin contexts of common law dram shop liability and 
statutory/administrative regulation of casino alcoholic beverage 
service."  Id. at 653.  In extending dram shop liability to the 
defendant casino, the court explained that its decision was 
"merely furthering the public policy goals underlying the Casino 
Control Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder."  Id. at 
654.0   
 Then, in Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel And Casino, Inc., 819 
F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1993), the district court, following Aboud, 
held that the casino could be liable for losses flowing from its 
allowing an intoxicated patron to gamble.  Id. at 1321-23.  Tose 
subsequently tried his case to a jury, which rejected his claim. 
Greate Bay Hotel And Casino, Inc. v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1228 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  On appeal, which focused mainly on the question 
whether the Casino Control Commission had exclusive primary 
jurisdiction over gamblers' claims against casinos, the judgment 
for the defendant was affirmed.  Id.  Because Tose lost his 
                     
0The holding of Aboud is actually broader than necessary for 
Hakimoglu:  "In sum, a casino has a duty to refrain from 
knowingly permitting an invitee to gamble where that patron is 
obviously and visibly intoxicated and/or under the influence of a 
narcotic substance."  Id. at 655.  This raises the interesting 
question about the scope of putative liability: is it liability 
for continuing to serve the intoxicated gambler (essentially a 
dram-shop theory), or liability for failure to stop him from 
gambling (essentially an invitee theory).  While in practical 
terms there may be little difference between the two, doctrinally 
I think that the proper issue is liability for continuing to 
serve.  At all events, Hakimoglu does not present a claim for 
failing to stop him from gambling. 
14 
trial, we did not need to decide whether New Jersey would 
recognize this cause of action.  Id. at 1232 n.7. 
 
II. 
 Analysis of this case under the principles of New 
Jersey tort law supports the conclusions of Aboud and Tose that 
New Jersey's highest court would recognize Hakimoglu's cause of 
action.  In Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 625 
A.2d 1110 (1993), the New Jersey Supreme Court set out its 
standard for determining when a tort duty, and thus a cause of 
action in negligence, exists.  The inquiry, "ultimately a 
question of fairness," requires the court to weigh (1) the 
relationship of the parties; (2) the nature of the risk; (3) the 
opportunity and ability to exercise care; and (4) the public 
interest in the proposed solution.  Id.  These factors support a 
cause of action in this case. 
 First, the relationship of the parties argues strongly 
for casino liability.  Casinos, perhaps the ultimate for-profit 
institution, make their money from patrons' losses.  Gambling 
losses are the casino's business.  The casino and the gambler, 
therefore, are linked in an immediate business relationship much 
like that from which dram shop liability sprang -- the tavern and 
the patron.  See Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 188, 156 A.2d at 1.  Like 
the tavern owner, the casino's control over the environment into 
which the patron places himself, and its ability to open or close 
the alcohol spigot, imposes on the casino some concomitant 
responsibility toward that patron.  Just as the tavern owner must 
15 
make sure that drinking does not cause her patron to hurt himself 
or others, the casino should ensure that its alcohol service does 
lead its patron to hurt himself through excessive gambling.   
 Second, the nature of the risk -- essentially a test of 
foreseeability -- also points to casino liability.  Gamblers come 
to the casino to gamble; the casino supplies free alcohol; the 
odds favor the casino.  Losses are the natural result, if not the 
intent, of this situation.  Unacceptable losses due to alcohol 
consumption are certainly foreseeable.   
 This foreseeability factor explains the inapplicability 
of contrary authority.  The New Jersey Supreme Court's recent 
limitations of dram shop liability, fairly read, all turn on a 
lack of foreseeability.  See, e.g., Lombardo v. Hoag, 269 N.J. 
Super. 36, 634 A.2d 550 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 135 
N.J. 469, 640 A.2d 850 (1994) (rejecting duty of passenger to 
stop owner of vehicle from driving because imposing such an 
"overbroad duty would open a Pandora's box of potential liability 
and responsibility problems"); Jensen v. Schooley's Mountain Inn, 
Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 79, 522 A.2d 1043 (App. Div.) certif. 
denied, 528 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1987) (tavern not liable for 
intoxicated customer's death after he climbed to top of tree, 
fell, and drowned in river); Griesenbeck v. Walker, 199 N.J. 
Super. 132, 488 A.2d 1038 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1985), 
certif. denied, 501 A.2d 932 (1985) (no cause of action against 
social host for physical injuries from a fire at guest's 
residence which occurred after the guest returned intoxicated).   
16 
 Lack of foreseeability also explains why the New Jersey 
courts and legislature have never extended liability for tavern 
owners and social hosts (as opposed to casinos) beyond physical 
injuries and property damage.  See Griesenbeck, 199 N.J. Super. 
at 144, 488 A.2d  at 1043 (App. Div. 1985) (observing that the 
court has never extended liability for servers of alcohol beyond 
injuries related to drunken driving, barroom accidents and 
barroom brawls); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-1 et seq. (1987) 
(codifying liability for physical injury and property damages for 
"licensed alcoholic beverage server[s]").0  Casinos, on the other 
hand, can plainly foresee large and unacceptable losses from 
patrons they help get drunk.  And the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has made clear that tort is an appropriate basis for liability 
(possibly in addition to a contract theory, see supra n.1), even 
if no physical damage occurs, when the losses are foreseeable. 
See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985) (allowing airline to 
recover economic damages in tort when defendant's tank car 
accident required it to vacate its offices). 
 Finally, the presence of foreseeability rebuts the 
casinos complaint that recognizing liability in this case would 
lead to unfair and extreme results.  A restaurant located near a 
casino would be held liable, the casinos argue, if it served 
alcohol to a patron who became intoxicated, entered the casino, 
                     
0Because casinos are not "licensed alcoholic beverage server[s]" 
under the act, this law does nothing to limit casino liability 
directly. 
17 
and lost money.  This, they imply, would be unfair.  That may be 
so.  But because foreseeability is lacking in the casinos' 
hypothetical, the analogy to the present case does not withstand 
scrutiny.  The restaurant and its customer, in the casinos' 
hypothetical, do not stand in a similar posture to a casino and 
its gambling patron.  The restaurant is not in the gambling 
business and does not necessarily know whether the dining patron 
would later be gambling.  The loss involved, therefore, is too 
remote to fairly and rationally hold the restaurant accountable. 
By contrast, in a casino setting with gambling as the primary 
activity, there is no difficulty in foreseeing that the patron 
will engage in that activity and the high chance that he will 
suffer financial losses under a state of intoxication.  
      The third factor -- the opportunity and ability to 
exercise care -- further suggests liability here.  To a much 
greater degree than tavern owners, casino operators can readily 
protect themselves against the type of liability sought to be 
imposed here.  Unlike most tavern owners, restaurateurs or social 
hosts, casinos generally have huge staffs and sophisticated 
surveillance cameras.  Gamblers, particularly high rollers, are 
constantly monitored by a dealer, floor persons, a pit boss, 
hidden cameras, and sometimes even officials of the New Jersey 
Casino Control Commission.  See Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1320.  When 
the line is crossed, the casino need only refuse to serve more 
alcohol.0   
                     
0Again, on the theory that Hakimoglu pursues (based on dram shop 
liability), the casino presumably would need only to stop serving 
18 
 Of course, the patron is also in a position to exercise 
care by not getting drunk.  But this does not undermine my 
argument.  New Jersey has made it clear that if the intoxicated 
person sues for injuries to himself, he may be charged with 
contributory negligence.  See Kiku, 127 N.J. at 170, 603 A.2d at 
503.  Imposing contributory negligence is not a retreat from the 
policy underlying dram shop liability; rather, it is best 
explained as an effort to fairly apportion the loss among all who 
bear some responsibility.  See Fisch v. Bellshot, 135 N.J. 374, 
387, 640 A.2d 801, 807 (1994) ("[P]ublic policy is best served by 
limiting a licensee's dram shop liability through the application 
of comparative negligence rather than by eliminating such 
liability altogether.").  This holding also ensures, from the 
standpoint of deterrence, that both parties in a position to 
avert the harm take steps to prevent it. 
 Finally, the public interest in the proposed solution 
also leads to the conclusion that New Jersey would recognize this 
cause of action.  Throughout its history, New Jersey has 
exercised strict control over various types of gambling.  See 
Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1319.  Indeed, only by a constitutional 
provision or amendment can any type of gambling be lawfully 
conducted in this state, subject to approved "restrictions and 
control."  N.J. Const., Art. IV, § VII, par. 2.  In an 
                                                                  
the patron alcohol after he became obviously and visibly 
intoxicated.  It would not need to bar him from further gambling, 
though hopefully the refusal to serve might serve as a "wake-up 
call."  On the broader theory articulated in Aboud, however, the 
casino might have to keep a patron from gambling, even if he had 
become drunk elsewhere.  
19 
environment where gambling has been regarded as "an activity rife 
with evil," the state's general ban on casino gambling should be 
no surprise.  See Petition of Soto, 236 N.J. Super. 303, 314, 565 
A.2d 1088, 1094 (App. Div. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937 
(1990).   
 Concern for the struggling city's welfare drove New 
Jersey citizens to allow casino operations, with strict controls, 
in Atlantic City.  See Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1319.  The 1977 
Casino Control Act establishes a comprehensive and elaborate 
regulatory framework for the casino industry, reflecting a 
concern that casinos be restrained in order to protect the 
public.  See N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 to 190; see also Knight v. City of 
Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 380, 431 A.2d 833, 836-37 (1981).  The Act 
typically regulates the gambling operators rather than penalizing 
the individual gamblers.  For instance, casinos, rather than an 
underage gambler, are held liable when the latter enters a 
casino.  See N.J.S.A. 5:12-119; see also Department of Law & 
Public Safety v. Boardwalk Regency, 227 N.J. Super. 549, 548 A.2d 
206 (App. Div. 1988) (holding casino responsible for allowing two 
underage persons to gamble).   
 When it passed the Act, the New Jersey legislature 
recognized that casinos -- with their concentration of wealth --
have disproportionate power over the political process.  See 
Petition of Soto, 236 N.J. Super. at 313, 565 A.2d at 1093-94. As 
expressed in the Act, it is New Jersey's pronounced policy to 
regulate casinos "with the utmost strictness to the end that 
public confidence and trust in the honesty and integrity of the 
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State's regulatory machinery can be sustained."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  The historical background reveals that New Jersey 
recognizes an important public interest in protecting gamblers. 
From New Jersey's perspective, requiring casinos to protect 
gamblers from losses flowing from their excessive service of 
alcohol would probably also be in the public interest.   
 The most plausible objection to my position is that 
torts of negligence generally seek to deter and compensate for 
the destruction of wealth, while the tort in this case is 
arguably merely allocative.  In other words, a typical economic 
tort would redress negligence that shut down a factory, causing a 
loss in production, while in this case the alleged tortfeasor 
casino coaxes the money from the gambler and then retains it. 
Society is no worse off; different parties just possess the 
wealth.  But allocative economic torts, at least for intentional 
acts of conversion, are no stranger to New Jersey law.  See, 
e.g., Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 96 
A.2d 652 (1953); Charles Bloom & Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 279 N.J. 
Super. 372, 652 A.2d 1238 (App. Div. 1995); Lombardi v. Marzulli, 
230 N.J. Super 205, 553 A.2d 67 (Law Div. 1988).   
 For all the foregoing reasons, application of the 
Hopkins criteria, see supra at 6, counsels us to recognize this 
cause of action under New Jersey law, particularly when analyzed 




 The arguments of the majority and the district court do 
not compel a different result.  These arguments, drawn largely 
from Judge Irenas's footnote in Tose,0 rest on two main 
assertions:  (1) that Miller v. Zoby, 250 N.J. Super. 568, 595 
A.2d 1104 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 606 A.2d 366 (N.J. 1991), 
undermined Aboud; and (2) that the intense legislative regulation 
of gambling precluded the court from finding this cause of 
action.  In the present case, Judge Simandle relied on both 
assertions, see Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates, 876 F. 
Supp. 625, 630-31, 633 (D.N.J. 1994), and the majority places 
most of its stock in the legislative "scope preemption" argument. 
Both of these assertions are incorrect.   
 First, it is untrue that the Appellate Division's 
decision in Zoby undermined Aboud.  In Zoby, the court denied an 
implied cause of action against a casino for violating credit 
regulations.  Id. at 1104.  But this court in Tose carefully 
distinguished Zoby as involving the availability of an implied 
right of action under the Casino Control Act -- analytically a 
very different issue from the applicability of common law tort 
liability.  Greate Bay, 34 F.3d at 1232 n.7.  Like the case at 
bar, neither Aboud nor Tose was based on an implied cause of 
action under the Casino Control Act or its regulations.  Rather, 
                     
0The complicated procedural posture of the Tose case served as a 
sounding board for both sides of this debate.  Judge Rodriguez, 
to whom the case was originally assigned, elected to follow 
Aboud.  The case was then reassigned to Judge Irenas, who 
acknowledged that he was bound by Aboud as the law of the case, 
but noted his disagreement with that case in a footnote.  Tose, 
819 F. Supp. at 1316 n.8.     
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all involve common law causes of action, which I believe the New 
Jersey Supreme Court would recognize. 
 Second, the argument that legislation regulation of 
casinos precludes this common law cause of action both 
misapprehends New Jersey jurisprudence and overstates its own 
force.  This scope preemption argument, which forms the bulk of 
the majority opinion, mistakes New Jersey jurisprudence by 
viewing this issue through the lens of federal court interpretive 
assumptions, including great deference to legislative bodies.  If 
this case presented an issue of federal law, a federal court 
might view the extensive legislative regulation of casinos as 
precluding it from properly recognizing this cause of action. But 
many factors might fundamentally affect how a state supreme court 
would interpret and make the law.  To reiterate, this case 
requires us to predict what the New Jersey Supreme Court would do 
if presented with this situation.  See Robertson, 914 at 378.  
 In my view, as explained above, New Jersey's 
jurisprudence differs from that of the federal courts:  New 
Jersey is likely to recognize a cause of action when the Hopkins 
factors are present, even where, because of extensive legislative 
regulation, federal courts would not.  New Jersey's high court 
has made clear that tort liability, historically a judicial 
matter, falls squarely in its bailiwick.  "[W]e do not agree that 
the issue addressed in this case is appropriate only for a 
legislative resolution.  Determination of the scope of duty in 
negligence cases has traditionally been a function of the 
judiciary."  Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226; accord 
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Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439, 625 A.2d at 1116 ("[D]etermining the 
scope of tort liability has traditionally been the responsibility 
of the courts.").  In Dunphy, the court's most recent expansion 
of tort liability, the court stated: 
We have recognized, in numerous settings, that 
traditional principles of tort liability can be adapted 
to address areas in which recognition of a cause of 
action and the imposition of a duty of care are both 
novel and controversial.   
  
136 N.J. at 109, 642 A.2d at 376-77 (citations omitted).   
 As I have explained, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
long been hospitable to the recognition of liability for 
drinking-related injuries.  See, e.g., Sorenen, 46 N.J. at 582, 
218 A.2d at 630 (extending dram shop liability to patron's own 
injuries); Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at 538, 476 A.2d at 1219 (extending 
dram shop liability to social hosts).  This willingness to define 
the scope of liability exists even where the conduct at issue is 
the subject of legislative or administrative regulation.  See, 
e.g., Kiku, 127 N.J. at 170, 603 A.2d at 503 (creating 
contributory negligence defense in dram shop action against 
restaurant despite intense legislative regulation of alcohol, 
restaurants, and codification of dram shop liability).   
 Indeed, even the authority cited by the casinos as 
"indicative of the firm efforts of the New Jersey courts to limit 
the liability of a server of alcohol for a plaintiff's injuries" 
acknowledges that the state supreme court is free to recognize 
new causes of action.  In Lombardo, 269 N.J. Super. at 36, the 
court reversed the trial court's decision to extend dram shop 
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liability.  In doing so, it noted "that it is generally not 
considered the function of a trial court to create an exception 
to an established rule of law.  Such a function is generally 
reserved for the Supreme Court or the legislature."  Id. at 48 
(citations omitted).  To emphasize again, our task here is to 
determine what the New Jersey Supreme Court -- not a trial court 
-- would do in this situation.  See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1167 (3d Cir. 1981).  
 Moreover, even given federal jurisprudential 
assumptions, the scope preemption argument is overstated.  As I 
will explain, the logical extension of this argument would lead 
to an absurd result:  namely, absolving casinos for liability 
when patrons they have continued to serve kill others in drunk 
driving accidents.  As the majority points out, the Casino 
Control Act closely regulates casino operation.  In particular, 
the casinos, like the taverns, are not permitted to serve visibly 
and obviously intoxicated persons.  See N.J.S.A. 5:12-103(d) & 
(f)(2); N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(b).  The other act on which the 
majority leans for scope preemption, the Licensed Alcoholic 
Beverage Server Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-1 et seq., imposes liability 
for physical and property injury when licensed alcoholic beverage 
servers (not including casinos) serve already intoxicated 
persons.  Under the majority's approach, because of this lacuna, 
casinos would not be liable for deaths caused by a gambler that 
it nevertheless continues to serve after the gambler is obviously 
intoxicated.  In passing these two acts, the legislature must 
have thought of this possibility, and yet made no provision for 
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it.  It cannot be the case, however, that a host is liable for 
injuries that his guest sustained after drinking at a dinner 
party while casinos are absolved from liability for drunk driving 
accidents, even to third parties, under New Jersey law.  The 
scope preemption argument is thus flawed for this reason as well. 
  
IV.   
 While our job is not to make policy for New Jersey (and 
we should be careful not to do so accidently by interpreting New 
Jersey law under assumptions of legislative deference it does not 
share), policy rationales would, in fact, guide the state's high 
court in appraising this putative cause of action.  The district 
court enumerated seven problems to recognizing this cause of 
action.  I will set out and rebut these objections below. 
 The first objection is essentially that the aggrieved 
gambler, as such, had no inhibitions that alcohol could overcome. 
Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 636.  The second objection is that the 
gambler, seeking risk, got just what he came for.  Id.  These two 
objections seem to state the same point; hence I deal with them 
together.  The point is that, inhibitions or not, the gambler got 
much more than he came for.  Tavern patrons, of course, come to 
drink, but injury results if they become so drunk that they hurt 
themselves or someone else, and dram shop liability attaches.  It 
is surely true, as Judge Simandle observed, that sober gamblers 
can lose big and intoxicated gamblers can win big.  However, ex 
ante, gambling is a form of consumption because the odds favor 
the casino.  In other words, because the casino wins in the long 
26 
run, statistically the patron is paying to gamble.  The patron is 
consuming a nondurable good like someone dining out, taking a 
vacation -- or drinking liquor.  Alcohol, by impairing judgment 
and lowering inhibitions, can lead the patron to consume more 
than he would if he were sober.  As with drinking itself, 
excessive consumption in the form of alcohol-induced gambling can 
cause quite severe injury -- just ask the spouse of a gambler 
whose house is foreclosed and kids withdrawn from their schools 
because the gambler lost the family's savings.  And the damage 
can be wrought in an instant.  This is more than even the most 
uninhibited person bargains for. 
 The third, also related objection is that alcohol 
cannot interfere with responsible gambling because gambling 
requires no particular skill.  Id.  To begin with, the latter 
part of this assertion is wrong.  Although slot machines require 
no particular ability, many others games do require skill in 
counting cards and making strategic choices.  See Tose, 819 F. 
Supp. at 1319 n.9 (discussing how card counting improves a 
bettor's odds).  As a whole, this assertion is also beside the 
point.  Even if a gambler plays a game requiring no skill, 
alcohol can have a critical effect on his judgment about when to 
stop playing.  
 The fourth objection is that problems of proof --
principally regarding proximate causation -- would confound fact-
finders in evaluating such claims.  Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 
636.  Once again, the relevant concern here is not, as the 
casinos suggest, whether the intoxicated gambler reduces his odds 
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of winning because of his inability to play "prudently."  Rather, 
the issue is whether the intoxication impairs the gambler's 
ability to determine when to stop gambling when his losses grow 
beyond a level which he can afford.  And proof of the nexus 
between the intoxicated status of a high roller such as Hakimoglu 
and his losses seems less difficult than determining the 
causation of cancer in many medical malpractice and toxic tort 
cases.  Regardless, it does not furnish a basis on which to 
conclude that New Jersey would shy away from recognizing a cause 
of action.  See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 100 
N.J. 246, 254, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (1985) (explaining that an 
"asserted inability to fix crystalline formulae for recovery on 
the differing facts of future cases simply does not justify the 
wholesale rejection of recovery in all cases").    
 I acknowledge that it is not always easy to determine 
when a gambler is intoxicated.  But this matter is before us on a 
motion under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), and we must take the 
well pleaded facts as true.  And when we do, the alleged 
(mis)conduct of the defendant casinos, i.e., that they continued 
to serve a visibly intoxicated gambler who was losing millions of 
dollars, should be sufficient to state a claim for relief under 
the federal rules.  I do not mean to pin a medal on the gambler, 
especially one such as Hakimoglu, who knows full well what he is 
doing when he goes repeatedly to the casino and loses big.  The 
jury may have no sympathy for him and find him contributorily 
negligent, or find the casino not liable at all, as it did in the 
Tose case.  But that is a question for the jury:  whether as the 
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result of the casino's (mis)conduct, the gambler has lost his 
ability to make a reasonable judgment as to whether to continue. 
In my view, such an individual, at such a time, appears to be 
within the class that the New Jersey jurisprudence protects. 
 The district court's fifth objection is that 
recognizing this tort could open the floodgates to fraudulent 
claims.  Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 637.  A typical dram shop 
claim, defendants argue, will follow an accident at which the 
police will be called, the blood alcohol content of the driver 
examined and witnesses interviewed.  But that is not always the 
case.  Many a dram shop claim -- and they are recognized by New 
Jersey without any prerequisite of prompt investigation -- are 
filed "out of the blue" from the vantage point of the defendant. 
Moreover, lawsuits such as Hakimoglu's are both extremely costly 
to pursue and quite risky, and lawyers will not undertake them 
except in the rare case where losses are substantial.  The 
"floodgates" argument, therefore, is unconvincing.  And since the 
high rollers who are both losing and drinking big are surely 
identified at the time of their losses, the surveillance cameras 
can be concentrated on them and the tapes can be specially marked 
and preserved.  In other words, the casinos can protect 
themselves. 
 The sixth objection is that sufficient deterrence 
already exists because casinos cannot enforce credit markers 
entered into by drunk patrons.  Id.  A remedy in the marker 
situation, however, does nothing to deter losses in the many 
cases when, as here, the loss in question was not on credit. This 
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objection could be restyled as one against overdeterrence (and 
its corresponding inefficiency), which is always a potential 
problem for torts.  If the casino had little to gain and much to 
lose from its behavior -- as it might if, say, New Jersey law 
allowed large recoveries for minor physical injuries sustained in 
a casino -- it might take overly zealous steps to prevent this 
occurrence.  Overdeterrence is not likely to be problematic here, 
however, because the casinos would be liable only up to the 
amount that they had gained by their tortious conduct.  They have 
much to gain and little to lose from continuing to serve 
intoxicated gamblers, even if this tort were recognized.  If 
anything, underdeterrence probably would remain the biggest 
problem:  only in some percentage of cases will the gambling 
losers claim and win their money back.0    
 Finally, the district court argues that the court 
should not recognize this cause of action because New Jersey's 
casino regulators have never required "a casino to refund such 
gaming losses allegedly incurred by an intoxicated patron at any 
time in sixteen years of casino gambling in New Jersey."  Id.  In 
addition to undermining its sufficient deterrence argument,0 this 
objection also misses the point.  The legal authority and policy 
choices of the casino commission have no bearing on how the New 
                     
0For more analysis of the economics of a gambling tort, and the 
connection between gambling and alcohol, see Jeffrey C. Hallam, 
Note, Rolling the Dice:  Should Intoxicated Gamblers Recover 
Their Losses, Nw. U. L. Rev. 240 (1990).  
0How can there be sufficient deterrence in the nonmarker 
situation when enforcement has been totally lacking? 
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Jersey Supreme Court, as a matter of common law, might choose to 
regulate this situation.     
    For all of the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize Hakimoglu's 
cause of action. 
V. 
 This case is its own best evidence, as the majority 
observes, of the utility of a certification procedure; I 
respectfully urge New Jersey to adopt one.0  The lack of a 
certification procedure disadvantages both New Jersey and the 
federal judiciary.  Especially in cases such as this where little 
authority governs the result, the litigants are left to watch the 
federal court spin the wheel.  Meanwhile, federal judges, by no 
means a high-rolling bunch, are put in the uncomfortable position 
of making a choice.0  In effect, we are forced to make important 
state policy, in contravention of basic federalism principles. 
See Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity 
Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671 
(1992).  The possibility that federal courts may make 
interpretive assumptions that differ from those of the state 
court further complicates this process.  States like New Jersey 
lacking certification procedures face the threat that federal 
courts will misanalyze the state's law, already open to varied 
                     
0Judges Nygaard and Alito have expressed their agreement with the 
recommendations contained in this part of my opinion. 
0I am, needless to say, not the first to make this observation.  
See, e.g., McKenna, 622 F.2d at 661 ("Although some have 
characterized this assignment as speculative or crystal-ball 
gazing, nonetheless it a task we may not decline.")  
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interpretations, by inadvertently viewing it through the lens of 
their own federal jurisprudential assumptions. 
 The mischief created by the lack of a certification 
procedure was demonstrated by Judge Sloviter when she catalogued 
some of the Third Circuit's missteps in interpreting the law of 
Pennsylvania, which also lacks a certification procedure: 
[W]e have guessed wrong on questions of the 
breadth of arbitration clauses in automobile 
insurance policies (we predicted they would 
not extend to disputes over the entitlement 
to coverage [Myers v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
842 F.2d 705 (3d Cir. 1988)], but they do 
[Brennan v. General Accident Fire & Life 
Assurance Corp., 574 A.2d 580 (Pa. 1990)], 
the availability of loss of consortium 
damages for unmarried cohabitants (we 
predicted that they would be available 
[Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 
(D.N.J. 1980)], but they are not [Leonardis 
v. Morton Chem. Co., 184 N.J. Super 10, 445 
A.2d 45 (App. Div. 1982)], and the 
"unreasonably dangerous" standard in products 
liability cases (we predicted the Restatement 
would not apply [Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 
402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 
F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976)], but it does 
[Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 
547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978)]. 
 
Sloviter, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1679-80.0  
                     
0For additional examples of our difficulty predicting state law, 
and a call for the State of Pennsylvania to adopt a certification 
procedure, see Stella L. Smetanka, To Predict or To Certify 
Unresolved Questions of State Law:  A Proposal for Federal Court 
Certification to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Temp. L. Rev. 
725 (1995).  In particular, Smetanka describes the Third 
Circuit's troubles in assessing the scope of Pennsylvania's 
public-policy exception to at-will employment in the wake of 
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).  For 
recent examples of this difficulty, see Borse v. Piece Goods 
Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992), and Smith v. Calgon 
Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990).    
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 New Jersey, in failing to adopt a certification 
procedure, is in a small minority.  At present, forty-three state 
supreme courts, the court of last resort in Puerto Rico, and the 
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia can answer certified 
questions of law from federal circuit courts.  See American 
Judicature Society ("AJS"), Certification of Questions of Law: 
Federalism in Practice 15-17 (1995).0  Granting certification 
power is also supported by the federal judiciary's Long Range 
Plan for the Federal Courts.  Recommendation 8 of that Plan 
states:  "The states should be encouraged to adopt certification 
procedures, where they do not currently exist, under which 
federal court (both trial and appellate) could submit novel or 
difficult state law questions to state supreme courts." Committee 
on Long Range Planning, Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 32 (March 1995).0  
Certification is not a panacea, and can inflict delay on 
litigants.  See Geri Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in 
the Use of Certification, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 305 (1994). But this is 
an argument for exercising the authority wisely --not for denying 
it altogether. 
                     
0[hereinafter "AJS Report"].  The states vary widely on whether 
the source of this authority is a constitutional provision, 
statute, court rule -- or a combination of the three. Id.  The 
states also differ considerably on their standard for accepting 
certified questions.  Eleven states require that the certified 
question be determinative of the litigation; twenty-six states, 
Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia require only that the 
question may be determinative; and six others require that there 
be -- or appear to be -- no controlling precedent or authority.  
AJS Report, supra, at 18-20. 
0Recommendation 8 was adopted by the Judicial Conference as part 
of the approved long range plan on September 19, 1995. 
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 Fifty-four percent of United States Circuit judges 
responding to the AJS survey indicated they were "willing" or 
"very willing" to certify questions, AJS Report, supra, at 43, 
and eighty percent of state supreme court justice said they were 
"willing" or "very willing" to answer these questions.  AJS 
Report, supra, at 46.  Ninety-five percent of the United States 
Circuit Judges and ninety percent of the United States District 
Judges were either "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with 
the certification process in their most recent certified case. 
Id. at 42.  In terms of overall satisfaction, eighty-seven 
percent of the state court justices said they were either "very 
satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with their most recent 
certification experience.  Id. at 43. 
 While this is not a forum for drafting a certification 
statute, I believe that a federal court should be authorized to 
certify a question of law to the state court when:  (1) the issue 
is one of importance; (2) it may be determinative of the 
litigation; and (3) state law does not provide controlling 
precedent through which the federal court could resolve the 
issue.  This is a textbook case for certification.  The issue is 
determinative of the litigation; important public policy issues 
are at stake; and little authority guides our decision. Moreover, 
neither the casinos nor Hakimoglu, with all their resources, 
require immediate resolution of the matter.  Yet, alas, New 
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 The majority fairly observes that this case is a 
difficult one and that reasonable arguments support either side. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the better arguments should lead us 
to predict that New Jersey would find a cause of action here, 
subject to the defense of contributory fault.  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has been highly hospitable to recognizing causes of 
action, even in areas where the legislature has acted, for 
foreseeable injuries.  The four factors the court uses for 
evaluating whether a duty exists -- (1) the relationship of the 
parties; (2) the nature of the risk; (3) the opportunity and 
ability to exercise care; and (4) the public interest -- all 
point toward finding a cause of action here.  And the policy 
objections of the majority and the litigants either miss the 
point or are overstated.  For all of the foregoing reasons, I 
believe the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize a cause of 
action, in tort, allowing patrons to recover gambling debts from 
casinos that serve them alcohol after they are visibly 
intoxicated.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
                     
0In order to bring this proposal to the attention of the 
appropriate New Jersey authorities, I request that the Clerk mail 
copies of this opinion, referencing Part V of the dissent, to the 
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Director of 
the Administrative Office of New Jersey Courts, the Chair of the 
Judiciary Committees of the New Jersey House and Senate, and the 
Attorney General of New Jersey. 
